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Abstract
This paper characterizes risk preferences both theoretically and empirically in a model
with two consumption goods, one of which involves a commitment in that an adjust-
ment cost must be paid when the good is sold. In this environment, risk aversion with
respect to moderate-scale shocks is ampliﬁed relative to risk aversion over large-scale
shocks. In addition, agents have a motive to take certain gambles with large pay-
oﬀs. Using event studies of consumption behavior around unemployment shocks, we
provide evidence that the commitment of homeownership distortsc o n s u m p t i o nd e c i -
sions, thereby amplifying the welfare cost of moderate shocks. During unemployment
spells, renters reduce both housing and food consumption, whereas homeowners con-
centrate expenditure reductions primarily on food. However, for unemployment shocks
that involve large income losses, homeowners reduce both food and housing expendi-
ture sharply. These results indicate that commitments can explain two puzzles in the
standard expected utility model: high moderate-stake risk aversion and lottery playing
by insurance buyers. The model has implications for a broad set of issues including
optimal social insurance policies and portfolio choice.
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tance. We are grateful for ﬁnancial support from National Science Foundation grant SES 0522073 .Many households have “consumption commitments” that are costly to adjust when shocks such
as job loss or illness occur. For example, most homeowners do not move during unemployment spells
(Gruber 1998), and eﬀectively have a commitment to make mortgage payments. Commitments
extend beyond housing: Warren and Tyagi (2003) ﬁnd that nearly 70% of the average household’s
budget is to some extent non-discretionary in the short run (e.g., vehicles, insurance contracts,
utilities, educational expenses). In a series of case studies featured in the New York Times,
families aﬀected by adverse shocks frequently report diﬃculties in paying rent, medical expenses,
and other bills for pre-committed expenditures.1 This paper proposes a model of commitments
and risk preferences, and tests its empirical relevance using microdata on household behavior. The
results suggest that incorporating consumption commitments into the analysis of risk preferences
can help explain several stylized facts and yields a number of new normative implications.
The canonical expected utility model of risk preferences does not allow for commitments because
it assumes that agents consume a single composite commodity. This assumption requires that
agents can substitute freely among consumption goods at all times. When some goods cannot
be costlessly adjusted, a composite commodity does not exist, and the standard expected utility
model cannot be applied. We study the eﬀect of commitments on risk preferences by building
on Grossman and Laroque (1990), who analyze consumption and asset pricing in a model with
a single durable good. We analyze a model in which agents consume two goods — one that is
freely adjustable at all times (food), and one that requires payment of a transaction cost to change
consumption (housing). The introduction of the second adjustable good facilitates the analysis for
reasons described below.
We consider an environment in which agents are subject to wealth shocks (e.g., unemployment
or illness) after making a housing commitment. Under weak conditions, agents follow an (S,s)
policy over housing: they move if they have a large unexpected gain or loss in wealth, but do not
move in the intermediate region. We focus on characterizing the value function over wealth for
agents with a commitment, v(W), which determines the welfare cost of shocks and risk preferences.
In the conventional model without adjustment costs, v(W) is a concave function. The introduction
of commitments aﬀects the shape of v(W) relative to this benchmark in two ways.
First, commitments amplify risk aversion over moderate stake risks. Within the (S,s) band, the
curvature of v(W) is greater than it would be if the household had no commitments (i.e., if housing
1See, e.g., New York Times (Nov. 15, 2002); Warren and Tyagi also cite several examples (e.g. p53).
1were freely adjustable). Intuitively, for shocks that do not induce moves, households are forced to
concentrate all reductions (or increases) in wealth on changes in food consumption. For example,
if a family needs to reduce total expenditure by 10% and has pre-committed half of its income, they
are forced to reduce spending on discretionary items such as food by 20%. This forced distortion
in the consumption bundle ampliﬁes the curvature of v(W) within the (S,s) band (as in Figure 1),
particularly when agents face borrowing constraints that prevent smoothing across periods. For a
shock suﬃciently large to warrant moving, further reductions in wealth are optimally diversiﬁed by
cutting both food and housing, and therefore do not generate as high a marginal welfare cost. This
restores the curvature of v(W) to the lower no-commitment level outside the (S,s) band. Hence,
commitments amplify the welfare cost of small, temporary shocks such as unemployment relative
to the welfare costs of larger shocks such as long-term illness.
The second eﬀect of commitments on risk preferences is to generate a motive to take certain
gambles. The gambling motive arises from non-concavities in v(W) at the edges of the (S,s) band:
the marginal utility of wealth at S − ε is lower than the marginal utility of wealth at S + ε.A s a
result, committed agents may take bets that have big payoﬀs. Intuitively, an agent with a housing
commitment who earns an extra dollar can spend it only on food; but buying a lottery ticket gives
him an opportunity to “buy the dream” of owning a bigger house, which can have higher expected
utility than just another dollar of food.
These two properties of v(W) suggest that commitments can help resolve two basic puzzles that
arise in expected utility theory. The ﬁrst is that plausible degrees of risk aversion over large stakes
imply minimal risk aversion over moderate-stake risks in the standard expected utility model (Hans-
son 1988, Kandel and Stambaugh 1991, Rabin 2000). Yet introspection and empirical evidence
suggest that moderate-stake risk aversion is quite high in practice. For instance, the demand for
non-catastrophic insurance coverage (e.g., health or auto insurance) and social insurance programs
that insure shocks such as unemployment or injury can only be rationalized with high degrees of
risk aversion (see e.g., Gruber 1997). The second puzzle is that individuals buy some types of
insurance yet also buy lottery tickets. Friedman and Savage (1948) proposed a non-concave utility
over wealth to explain lottery playing.2 Commitments can be interpreted as microfoundations for a
non-concave utility over wealth in a model with standard diminishing marginal utility preferences.
2Non-concave utilities have also been emphasized in recent work by Hartley and Farrell (2002) and Becker, Murphy,
and Werning (2005).
2The primary mechanism through which commitments aﬀect risk preferences is by forcing house-
holds to deviate from ideal unconstrained consumption plans for moderate-scale shocks. We test
the strength of this mechanism empirically using panel data on unemployment shocks and food and
housing consumption from the PSID. We focus on two predictions derived from the model. The
ﬁrst is that individuals who have high adjustment costs for housing should concentrate more of
their expenditure reduction on food when they become unemployed relative to individuals with low
adjustment costs, who should adjust both food and housing. To test this, we compare consumption
growth rates of renters and homeowners in a ten-year window around the date of unemployment
using a non-parametric event-study methodology. As predicted, renters (who have lower mov-
ing costs) reduce both food and housing consumption almost equally when unemployed, whereas
homeowners reduce food consumption much more sharply than housing (see Figure 3).
The second testable implication is that the distortion in the food-housing consumption bundle
should be smaller for large shocks that push homeowners out of the (S,s) band than for small
shocks. This is the mechanism that ampliﬁes the welfare cost of moderate stake shocks relative
to large, move-inducing shocks. We test this prediction by dividing unemployment shocks into two
groups on the basis of the total wage loss associated with the shock. For large shocks (total wage
loss greater than 33% of previous annual wage), homeowners reduce food consumption immediately
and housing consumption with a one-year lag by 15-20%. In contrast, for small shocks, housing
consumption remains constant while food consumption falls by 10% (see Figures 4-5). Housing
commitments therefore amplify the welfare cost of moderate-scale shocks, but not large shocks, as
the model predicts. All of these ﬁndings are robust to controls and several speciﬁcation checks.
A natural concern with our empirical methodology is that households are not randomly allocated
into the homeowner and renter or small and large shock groups, potentially creating selection and
omitted variable biases in our estimates. While we cannot deﬁnitively rule out such concerns, we
argue in the course of our empirical analysis that the full set of results are diﬃcult to explain with
alternative stories. Based on a simple calibration, the empirical estimates imply that commitments
amplify moderate-stake risk aversion by at least a factor of 3 relative to the benchmark case without
adjustment costs. The substantial eﬀect of commitments on the welfare cost of moderate-scale
shocks has implications for several issues, which we describe in the conclusion.
Our model is related to several papers in the literature on consumption and durable goods,
starting with the seminal work of Grossman and Laroque (1990). Our analysis extends this work
3in two ways. First, because Grossman and Laroque study a continuous time model with a smooth
diﬀusion process for wealth, they do not explore how risk preferences vary with the size of the
gamble. We show that commitments induce substantial diﬀerences between risk aversion over small
and large shocks. Second, by introducing an adjustable good, we show that commitments aﬀect
risk preferences by changing the sensitivity of adjustable consumption to shocks. This observation
permits us to derive and implement transparent empirical tests of the commitments mechanism
using panel data on adjustable consumption.
Our analysis is also related to studies that apply adjustment cost models to understand macro-
economic consumption behavior (e.g., Bertola and Caballero 1990, Caballero 1993). More recently,
Flavin and Nakagawa (2003) analyze asset pricing in a two-good adjustment cost model, and ﬁnd
that it ﬁts consumption data better than neoclassical models. Several recent studies have also
explored the implications of two-good commitments models in other contexts, including Fratantoni
(2001), Li (2003), Postlewaite, Samuelson and Silverman (2004), and Shore and Sinai (2004). We
discuss some of these papers in more detail in the context of our analysis. None of these studies
explore the implications of adjustment costs for the welfare costs of small vs. large gambles.
We would like to emphasize some limitations of our analysis before proceeding. Though our
model can explain risk aversion over moderate risks such as unemployment, it cannot explain
“ﬁrst-order” risk aversion with respect to very small gambles (e.g., $10-$100 stakes). Explaining
such behavior requires a kink in the utility function, as in models of reference-dependence and
loss aversion (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Koszegi and Rabin 2005). The commitments
model is not inconsistent with loss aversion, and quantifying the relative contribution of the two
models over various stakes would be an interesting direction for future research. More generally,
further empirical work with more detailed consumption data and structural estimation of preference
parameters is needed to obtain a full characterization of the risk preferences induced by various
types of commitments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a model of
commitments, characterizes risk preferences, and derives testable predictions. Section 2 describes
the estimation strategy and data, and section 3 gives the empirical results. The paper concludes
with a discussion of the implications of the model. All proofs are given in the appendix.
41T h e o r y
1.1 Setup
The leading example of a good involving a commitment is owning a house. Changing consumption
of housing typically entails moving expenses and large transaction costs. Broker fees are around
5% of a home’s listing price, and leaving a neighborhood could have additional costs such as having
to change schools for children. More generally, any durable good (e.g., vehicles, furniture) involves
some commitment, as market resale values are signiﬁcantly lower than actual values. Finally, a
number of services involve explicit contracts and penalties for early termination — examples include
personal health insurance, health clubs, cellular phones, and cable television.3 As Table 1 shows,
goods involving commitments comprise a signiﬁcant portion of most households’ budgets.4
To explore the eﬀects of such commitments on risk preferences, consider a household that lives
for T periods and consumes two goods: adjustables, such as food (f), and commitments, such
as housing (x). Adjusting commitment consumption that provides x units of services per period
requires payment of an adjustment cost k · x where k>0.5 The household’s problem is to choose
a consumption path to maximize the expected value of lifetime utility:
E0
T X
t=1
u(ft,x t)
where period utility u(f,x) is strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly concave, and twice
diﬀerentiable.
The household has a risky income stream denoted by yt.L e tWt denote wealth at the beginning
of period t. The change in wealth, Wt+1 − Wt, is determined by income minus expenditure on
current food and housing consumption, less moving costs kxt−1 in the event that the household
3Late payments do not eliminate commitments. In the event of an income shock, the individual must still eventually
pay the bill. The ability to make late payments is simply an additional credit channel.
4At least the ﬁrst ﬁve categories in Table 1 could involve commitments. As the fraction of committed expenditures
is not crucial for the theoretical analysis, we leave the precise deﬁnition open to interpretation.
5We do not model the reason that agents choose to consume goods such as housing by making the commitment of
homeownership rather than opting for more ﬂexible arrangements such as renting. In the case of housing, Glaeser and
Shapiro (2002) argue that the agency problems associated with renting create strong incentives for homeownership.
Moral hazard problems could also explain why it is often beneﬁcial to purchase rather than rent cars, appliances,
and furniture. See Postlewaite, Samuelson, and Silverman (2005) for a more formal analysis of why agents choose
to make commitments.
5decides to move. Normalizing the interest rate to zero, the household’s dynamic budget constraint
is therefore
Wt+1 = Wt + yt+1 − ft − xt − kxt−1 · 1{xt−1 6= xt}.
The timing of the household’s problem is as follows. In period zero, the household purchases a house
x0 to maximize expected utility given initial income y0 and its knowledge of the the distribution of
the future path of income. The household begins consuming f and x in period 1, which it enters
with wealth y0 and prior commitments x0. In period 1 and all subsequent periods, consumption
of ft and xt is chosen to maximize expected utility, taking into account the cost of adjusting prior
commitments.
We make two substantive assumptions to simplify the analysis of the household’s problem.
First, we abstract from capital market imperfections by allowing the household to borrow against
future income. Second, we assume that all uncertainty in the economy is resolved in period 1:
in particular, the household learns the entire realization of {yt}T
t=1 on that date. We discuss the
implications of relaxing these assumptions below.
1.2 Consumption Behavior
The optimal consumption policy in period 1 is governed by two state variables: prior commitments
x0 and lifetime wealth W = y0 +
PT
t=1 yt. Following the realization of W in period 1, there is
no subsequent uncertainty, which implies that the optimal consumption plan for all future periods
is deterministic. Since the discount factor and interest rate are zero, the household sets ﬂat con-
sumption paths to maximize utility: ft = f1 and xt = x1 for all t =1 ,2...,T.A s a r e s u l t ,i f t h e
household ever moves, it moves in period 1.
The decision to move in period 1 depends on a trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁto fh a v i n gt h e
optimal bundle of food and housing consumption and the transaction cost required to reach that
bundle. To characterize this decision formally, let vc(W,x0) denote the household’s value function
in period 1.T h e n
vc(W,x0)=m a x
¡
v0(W,x0),vm(W,x0)
¢
(1)
where v0(W,x0) is maximized utility conditional on never moving, and vm(W, x0) is the maximized
utility of a household who moves in period 1. The optimal choice of the household has a simple
6analytical solution if the utility function satisﬁes the following weak conditions.
A1 Inada conditions limf→∞ u1(f,x)=l i m x→∞ u2(f,x)=0and limf→0 u(f,x)=i n f f0,x0 u(f0,x 0)
for all x.
A2 The marginal utility of food is nondecreasing in housing consumption: u1,2(f,x) ≥ 0.
Both of these conditions are satisﬁed for a wide class of utility functions, including (1) the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) speciﬁcation as long as the elasticity of substitution is
not greater than 1; and (2) separable power utility over the two goods as long as the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion for food is 1 or higher. Under these conditions, the agent’s consumption
policy in period 1 can be written as an (S,s) rule similar to that in Grossman and Laroque (1990).
Lemma 1 Under assumptions A1 and A2, for each x0 > 0 there exist s<Ssuch that
(i) when W ∈ (s,S), the optimal policy is not to move:
xt = x0 and ft = W/T − x0.
(ii) when W/ ∈ (s,S), the optimal policy is to move, and
(ft,x t) = argmax{u(f,x) | f + x =( W − kx0)/T}.
(iii) when k increases, s falls and S increases.
The intuition underlying this result is straightforward. Suppose the agent experiences a large
negative wealth shock in period 1. Then he will be forced to reduce food consumption drastically in
order to maintain the housing commitment that he previously made. Since such a sharp reduction
in food consumption causes a large reduction in utility, it becomes optimal to pay the adjustment
cost and move into a smaller home. Conversely, if wealth rises sharply, rather than allocating all of
his extra wealth to food, whose marginal utility eventually diminishes to zero, he decides to pay an
adjustment cost and fully reoptimize his consumption bundle by upgrading to a large house. For
smaller shocks, the utility gain from reoptimizing the consumption bundle is insuﬃcient to oﬀset
the transaction cost, so there is an (S,s) band where the agent does not move.
7Assumptions A1 and A2 are useful in obtaining the (S,s) result because they guarantee that
the agent moves for large shocks. A1 ensures that the household will ﬁnd it optimal to move to
a smaller house rather than cut food consumption to zero. To understand the role of A2, consider
the case where f and x are perfect substitutes. In that case, A2 is violated, and the household
would never move, because housing and food are completely interchangeable.
Empirical evidence conﬁrms that agents do follow (S,s) policies over the consumption of illiquid
goods that involve ﬁxed adjustment costs (Eberly (1994), Attanasio (2000), Martin (2003)). In
addition, in our empirical analysis below, we show that homeowners move when they face unem-
ployment shocks that lead to large income losses, but not when they face small unemployment
shocks. Hence, violations of assumptions A1 or A2, if any, do not appear to be large enough to
cause deviations from the intuitive (S,s) policy in practice.
1.3 Risk Preferences
The welfare cost of shocks, and thus the household’s risk preferences, are determined by the shape of
the value function v(W, x0) in period 1. We formally characterize this function in a series of steps.
Before proceeding, it is helpful to introduce some notation. Let γn(W) represent the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion (CRRA) over wealth for a hypothetical agent who pays no adjustment costs for
food or housing. Let γc(W) represent the analogous parameter for an agent with commitments.6
Let γf =
−u11f
u1 (f,x) represent the CRRA over food, and deﬁne εuf,x = u12x
u1 as the elasticity of
u1(f,x) with respect to x. N o t et h a tb o t hγf and εuf,x are pure preference parameters: they
depend on the level of f and x only, and not on the presence or absence of adjustment costs.
Let fn(W) and xn(W) represent the optimal consumption choices as a function of wealth
in period 1 for a consumer who faces no adjustment costs. Let εn
f,W denote the elasticity of
food consumption with respect to wealth W in period 1 for this consumer, and let εc
f,W be the
corresponding elasticity in the presence of adjustment costs. Deﬁne the wealth elasticities of housing
εn
x,W and εc
x,W analogously.
Eﬀect of commitments on CRRA. Consider ﬁrst the benchmark case of a consumer who faces
6Throughout, we use the convention that a superscript c refers to the presence of adjustment costs while a
superscript n refers to the case of no adjustment costs.
8no adjustment costs. This consumer’s CRRA over wealth in period 1 is
γn(W)=
−vn
WWW
vn
W
= −W
u11
∂f
∂W + u12
∂h
∂W
u1
= γfεn
f,W − εuf,xεn
x,W. (2)
The intuition for this expression is as follows. Utility maximization requires that the marginal
utility of wealth equals the marginal utility of food at the optimum; that is, vn
W = u1(fn,x n).
Hence, the change in vW from a 1% increase in W is reﬂected by the change in uf.T h e m a r g i n a l
utility of food itself changes for two reasons: ﬁrst, because increased food consumption reduces
u1 and second, because increased housing consumption can aﬀect u1 because of complementarity
between the two goods.
For a consumer with adjustment costs, a similar calculation gives
γc(W,x0)=γfεc
f,W (3)
as long as W ∈ (s,S). There is no term involving the elasticity of x here because within the (S,s)
band, housing does not change with W.
In general, the terms in (2) and (3) are not directly comparable, because γf is evaluated at
diﬀerent values of (f,x) in the two cases. However, at the wealth level W0 where the optimal
choice of x with no adjustment costs is xn(W0)=x0, the consumption bundles are the same
irrespective of the level of adjustment costs. As this point, we can compute an exact value for the
change in risk aversion due to commitments:
γc(W0,x 0) − γn(W0)=γf ·
£
εc
f,W − εn
f,W
¤
+ εuf,xεn
x,W > 0. (4)
Equation (4) captures the key intuition of our model. It shows that commitments magnify risk
aversion for two reasons, corresponding to the two non-negative terms on the right hand side. The
ﬁrst term arises from the fact that wealth shocks are borne solely on the food margin when housing
consumption is ﬁxed. Thus, a 1% reduction in wealth requires a reduction of more than 1% in food
consumption, creating a larger increase in marginal utility than would occur without commitments,
when housing could also be cut. More concretely, consider an individual who loses his job and cuts
9back sharply on food or clothing expenditures to pay the mortgage and other bills. The welfare cost
of unemployment is larger for this individual because he cannot reduce commitment consumption
easily, forcing him to concentrate reductions on a few goods.
The second term in (4) shows that commitments magnify risk aversion further in the presence
of complementarity (u12 > 0). Without adjustment costs, the optimal response to a reduction in
wealth is to reduce both x and f.W h e nu12 > 0 the reduction in x reduces the marginal utility
of f, cushioning the eﬀect of the cut in f on marginal utility. When x cannot be adjusted, this
cushioning eﬀect is shut down, and a given drop in f has a larger impact on marginal utility. More
concretely, suppose the adjustable and commitment goods are electricity and housing. A given
reduction in electricity (used for heating) has a larger cost in terms of marginal utility when the
agent cannot simultaneously reduce housing consumption, magnifying risk aversion.
Curvature of the value function. The ampliﬁed risk aversion result in (4) can be extended to all
wealth levels in the (s,S) band by imposing restrictions on the how the curvature of u(f,x) varies
over a range of consumption bundles. In particular, we assume that the utility function satisﬁes
one of the following conditions.
A3 u(f,x) is homogenous of some degree 1 − γ.
A4 u(f,x) is separable, γf is constant and supx γx(x) < γf.
These assumptions allow for most common speciﬁcations of preferences over two goods, includ-
ing CES utility and separable preferences with diﬀerent power utilities over f and x,a sl o n ga s
risk aversion is lower over x than over f. The following proposition characterizes the curvature of
v(W,x0) at all wealth levels.
Proposition 1 Assume that A1 and A2 hold. Then,
(i) when either A3 or A4 holds, commitments magnify risk aversion: γc(W, x0) > γn(W) for
all W ∈ (s,S).
(ii) when either A3 or A4 holds, risk aversion is higher inside the (s,S) band than outside: for
all W ∈ (s,S) and W0 / ∈ (s,S), γc(W) > γc(W0).
(iii) agents have a gambling motive: vc(W,x0) is locally convex at W = s and at W = S,s ot h e
10one-sided derivatives satisfy
vc
1(s−,x 0) <v c
1(s+,x 0) and vc
1(S−,x 0) <v c
1(S+,x 0).
The results of this proposition are illustrated in Figure 1a, which plots the value functions
vc(W, x0) and vn(W). Part (i) establishes that commitments increase the curvature of the value
function at all W ∈ (s,S). Part (ii) of the proposition shows that a consumer with commitments is
more risk averse inside the (S,s) band than outside. This follows directly from (i), because outside
the (S,s) band the consumer has abandoned prior commitments and thus has preferences similar
to those of a consumer who faces no adjustment costs.
Part (iii) shows that commitments create an incentive to take some types of zero expected-
value gambles in period 1 because of the non-convexities in the value function at s and S.A g e n t s
only pursue gambles with large payoﬀs; fair gambles that have payoﬀs within the (s,S) band are
rejected. To see why commitments can generate a desire to take large-payoﬀ gambles, consider
an individual who is deciding whether to buy a candy bar that costs $1 or a fair lottery ticket for
$1 that will pay $1 million if he wins. A one good (no commitments) model assumes that the
agent will buy one million candy bars if he wins the lottery (or one million units of the composite
commodity). In this case, buying the lottery ticket is not optimal because the marginal utility
of candy is diminishing, and the agent would be better oﬀ getting one candy bar with certainty.
However, with commitments, the agent will buy more than just candy if he wins the lottery. While
the $1 he has in hand cannot be spent to buy a better house or car, the $1 million dollars can.
Borrowing constraints and persistent uncertainty. We now explore the implications of relaxing
some of the restrictive assumptions made above. First consider the eﬀect of borrowing constraints.
Suppose the consumer can never borrow, but has access to a savings technology. To simplify further,
assume that the income proﬁle is ﬂat starting in period 2, i.e., y2 = y3 = ... = yT = y.T h i si m p l i e s
that the borrowing constraint will not bind in periods 2 through T; however, it may bind in period
1 if the realization of y1 is low enough.
Figure 1b illustrates the eﬀect of the borrowing constraint on v(W,x0). For high wealth
realizations, the borrowing constraint has no eﬀect on the value function, because the consumer
does not want to borrow. However, once wealth falls below the point WBC,a tw h i c hy1 = y −y0,
the inability to borrow forces the consumer to concentrate additional reductions in expenditure
11solely on period 1 food consumption, instead of smoothing the reduction over T periods. The value
function therefore has a kink at WBC: the left hand side derivative is higher than the right hand
side derivative by a factor of T.
For low wealth realizations (below WBC), borrowing constraints further augment the degree to
which commitments amplify risk aversion. To see this, assume that γf is constant or decreasing
in f and suppose the household does not ﬁnd it optimal to move.7 In this case, if W<W BC,t h e
curvature of the value function is given by
γBC(W,x0)=γf(fBC,x 0) ·
W
fBC ≥ γf(fc,x 0) ·
W
T · fc = T · γc(W,x0).( 5 )
Equation (5) shows that the diﬀerence in the CRRA between the commitment and no-commitment
cases is further ampliﬁed by at least a factor of T if the agent faces a binding borrowing constraint.
Intuitively, agents without borrowing constraints can spread temporary shocks over many periods,
leading to small changes in marginal utility regardless of whether they have commitments. But
if a borrowing constraint binds, the household is forced to cut back on discretionary consumption
sharply in that period, and the potential welfare gain from relaxing a pre-commitment becomes
much greater.
We now brieﬂy discuss what happens when the consumer faces additional risk in future periods.
Note that (2) and (3) remain valid expressions for the CRRA in this case. However, the key
elasticity εc
f,W responsible for magniﬁed risk aversion may be reduced. This is because future risk
provides additional margins (in the form of future commitment consumption) that the consumer
can adjust in response to a shock. For example, suppose there is a high probability of a move-
inducing shock in period 2. In this case, commitments have little impact on risk aversion in period
1, because future commitment consumption is eﬀectively adjustable, and only current commitments
are not adjusted in response to the shock.
While the commitment eﬀect is reduced with future uncertainty, one can show that at wealth
level W0, risk aversion continues to be magniﬁed relative to the no adjustment cost benchmark.
Moreover, with borrowing constraints, the possibility of future adjustment becomes less relevant,
7The optimal moving policy with borrowing constraints is more complex than in the basic setup when W<W
BC.
Following a large negaitve shock in period 1, the consumer may decide to move into a small house permanently, or to
set a small x1 for one period only, and then move again in period 2. In the interest of space, we do not characterize
the dynamics of housing consumption in more detail here.
12and risk aversion could still be substantially ampliﬁed by commitments. These points indicate
that the importance of commitments for risk aversion is ultimately an empirical question.8
1.4 Welfare costs of non-negligible risks
Our analysis thus far has focused on the characterizing the shape of the value function by analyzing
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, which measures preferences over inﬁnitesimal risks. In
practice, most risks of interest (such as job loss) are not inﬁnitesimal, and it is therefore important
to understand the implications of commitments for the welfare costs of such risks. This analysis is
also useful for deriving testable predictions because the unemployment shocks we examine in our
empirical analysis are non-negligible.
To model non-negligible risks, let f W represent a random variable which equals the wealth
realization in period 1. Let Ef W denote the mean of f W. The welfare cost of this risk can be
measured by the proportional risk premium π(f W,x0,k) for a consumer with prior commitments
x0 and adjustment costs k. The risk premium π is deﬁned such that at the beginning of period 1,
the household is indiﬀerent between f W and a sure payment of Ef W ·
³
1 − π(f W,x0,k)
´
.
In order to compare risk aversion over gambles of diﬀe r e n ts i z e s ,i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt on o r m a l i z e
π by a measure of the size of the risk. To do so, consider the family of lognormally distributed
random variables f W with a ﬁxed mean Ef W ∈ (s,S). For each such f W,d e ﬁne the risk of f W as
σ2
f W =var
h
log f W
i
. A natural measure of the risk premium per unit of risk is then
γ(σ2
f W,x 0,k)=2
−log
³
1 − π(f W,x0,k)
´
σ2
f W
.
This measure of the risk premium is convenient because for a utility function that exhibits constant
relative risk aversion γ, the per-unit risk premium satisﬁes γ(σ2)=γ regardless of the shock size
σ2.9 This result obtains because the shocks under consideration are all lognormally distributed;
however, one could construct analogous measures for other families of random variables as well.
8In addition, factors omitted from the model, such as the ability to postpone small durable purchases (Browning
and Crossley 2004) or the ability to reduce maintenance expenditures for housing may reduce the bite of commitments.
9For vanishingly small risks, γ(σ
2
f W,x 0,k) is equal to the CRRA at the wealth level Ef W by the Arrow-Pratt
approximation. Hence, this measure of the risk premium per unit of risk is sometimes used to motivate the deﬁnition
of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) for details.
13Our objective is to examine how commitments aﬀe c tt h ew e l f a r ec o s t( m e a s u r e db yt h ep e r -
unit risk premium) for moderate-scale and large-scale risks.10 We deﬁne f W to be a “moderate
shock” with respect to k and x0 if its expected value and certainty equivalent satisfy Ef W ∈ (s,S)
and WCE(f W,x0,k) ∈ (s,S).I n w o r d s ,f W is a moderate shock if neither its mean nor certainty
equivalent induces the household to move.
Proposition 2 Assume that A1 and A2 hold. Then,
(i) Adjustment costs magnify moderate-stake risk aversion: For any moderate shock f W with
respect to k1 and x0,a n da n yk2 >k 1, π(f W,x0,k 1) ≤ π(f W,x0,k 2).
(ii) When either A3 or A4 holds, the per-unit risk premium is greater for small shocks than
large shocks: γ(σ2,x 0,k)=γc(Ef W,x0) for σ2 =0while limσ→∞ supγ(σ2,x 0,k) < γc(Ef W,x0).
This proposition formalizes the main results of the paper: Consumption commitments magnify
the welfare cost of moderate risks (shocks that usually do not induce households to abandon com-
mitments) relative to large risks. Part (i) shows that the risk premium demanded for moderate
shocks is greater for households that are more committed in the sense of having higher adjustment
costs for housing. The second part of the proposition shows that households with commitments
require greater compensation per unit of risk for small shocks than they do for large shocks. Hence,
small shocks such as temporary unemployment may be more costly relative to their magnitude than
large shocks such as longer-term job displacement.
These results are illustrated in Figure 2, which plots γ(.) as a function of risk size (σ2)f o rt w o
households with diﬀerent adjustment costs. Consistent with the proposition, the ﬁgure shows that
the per-unit risk premium is high for small risks, but asymptotes to a low level as the size of risk
increases. In contrast, for a consumer with power utility and no commitments, the per-unit risk
premium is ﬂa tb e c a u s ei td o e sn o tv a r yw i t ht h es i z eo ft h er i s k .T h eﬁgure also shows that the
consumer who faces higher adjustment costs is generally more risk averse, consistent with the ﬁrst
part of the proposition.
The mechanism underlying these results is that commitments force households to deviate from
ideal unconstrained consumption plans for moderate-scale shocks. To see how this more precisely,
10In this exercise, we vary the distribution of f W while holding x0 ﬁxed. This is consistent with x0 being endogenously
chosen if the consumer learns about the true distribution of f W after x0 is set. In that case, the consumer has a prior
over possible distributions f W at date zero.
14take a log-linear approximation to the change in marginal utility in response to a wealth shock
∆logW to obtain:
∆logvc
1(W,x0)
∆logW
≈− γf
∆logf
∆logW
+ εuf,x
∆logx
∆logW
. (6)
This equation, which is an extension of (2) for non-negligible risks, says that the eﬀect of a shock
on the marginal utility of wealth is determined by (1) the curvature of utility over food times the
size of the food drop associated with the shock; and (2) the elasticity εuf,x times the size of the
housing drop, which captures the “cushioning eﬀect” due to complementarity. Note that the ﬁrst
term in (6) is always negative while the second term is always non-negative. The two results in
Proposition 2 follow directly from this equation:
1. Households with high adjustment costs move infrequently in response to moderate-scale
shocks. They therefore cut food sharply but housing very little on average ( large
∆logf
∆logW and
small
∆logx
∆logW ) when hit by a negative shock. This makes the ﬁr s tt e r mi n( 6 )l a r g ea n dt h es e c o n d
term small, leading to a large increase in marginal utility. Households with lower adjustment costs
reduce both x and f,m a k i n gt h eﬁrst term smaller in magnitude and the second term larger in (6),
dampening the eﬀect of the shock on marginal utility. The welfare cost of the shock is greater for
households with high adjustment costs because they are forced to deviate further from the ideal
unconstrained combination of f and x.
2. Large shocks induce more households to move than small shocks. Agents with a housing
commitment who experience small negative shocks therefore cut food sharply but housing very
little on average (small
∆logx
∆logW and large
∆logf
∆logW ), while those who experience larger shocks reduce
both f and x. Again because of the more distorted consumption response, the welfare cost of a
small shock is greater relative to its magnitude than the welfare cost of a large shock.
These two points indicate that the extent to which commitments distort consumption bundles
directly determines the extent to which they aﬀect risk preferences. Therefore, a natural way to
test the empirical relevance of the model is to ask, “Do commitments force households to deviate
from ideal consumption bundles substantially when hit by moderate shocks in practice?” We turn
to this question in the next section.
152 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Estimation Strategy
We test the mechanism underlying the two results on commitments and non-negligible risks using
data on households’ consumption responses to shocks. We estimate the following equation on
various groups:
∆logci,g = αg + βc
g∆logWi,g + νi,g (7)
where c is either f (food) or x (housing), ∆logW is an unanticipated wealth shock, i indexes
individuals, and νi,g is an error term. In this equation, g denotes a group of households. Suppose
ﬁrst that there are two groups of households who experience moderate shocks: those who have
high adjustment costs for housing (g = H) and those who have low adjustment costs for changing
housing (g = R). Following the logic described in the previous section, the mechanism underlying
the part (i) of Proposition 2 yields our ﬁrst testable hypothesis:
H1: β
f
R > 0,βx
R > 0 and β
f
H > 0,βx
H ≈ 0 (8)
Now consider a diﬀerent grouping among households that all have high adjustment costs: a
s e tt h a te x p e r i e n c es m a l ls h o c k s( g = S) and a set that experience large shocks (g = L). The
mechanism underlying part (ii) of Proposition 2 yields our second testable hypothesis:
H2: β
f
S > 0,βx
S ≈ 0 and β
f
L > 0,βx
L > 0 (9)
The ideal way to test H1 and H2 would be an experiment in which households are randomly
allocated to two groups with diﬀerent adjustment cost levels, or to two groups that are subject to
shocks of diﬀerent sizes. Lacking such an experiment, we test the two predictions using observa-
tional data on consumption responses to unemployment shocks in various groups of households.
To test H1, we examine the eﬀects of unemployment on food and housing consumption for renters
and homeowners. Homeowners typically have higher adjustment costs for housing because of the
cost of selling a property. Consistent with this intuition, 36% percent of renters in our sample
move per year, whereas only 10% of homeowners move per year. H1 predicts that homeowners
16should reduce food consumption sharply but housing consumption by very little when unemployed,
while renters should reduce both. To test H2, we classify unemployment shocks into “small” and
“large” groups on the basis on the wage income loss associated with the shock. H2 predicts that
homeowners who experience a long unemployment duration with a large wage loss should behave
like renters in that they cut both food and housing consumption to accommodate this large shock.
Since we rely on observational data, we must make some identiﬁcation assumptions to esti-
mate the β coeﬃcients. Within each group, the estimated β coeﬃcients will measure the impact
of a wealth shock on consumption if (a) unemployment is an unanticipated event and (b) unem-
ployment aﬀects consumption only because of reduced income, and not complementarity between
consumption and labor supply. These assumptions are supported by existing studies of consump-
tion smoothing during unemployment spells, such as Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley
(2001). These studies demonstrate that consumption of food falls by approximately 8-10% on
average when agents become unemployed, and that increases in unemployment beneﬁts reduce the
size of the consumption drop (particularly for low asset households). Gruber’s estimates imply that
with suﬃciently high unemployment beneﬁts, there would be no consumption drop associated with
unemployment, suggesting that borrowing constraints (and not complementarity) drive the con-
sumption drops.11 Moreover, in our own empirical analysis, we ﬁnd that consumption is stable in
the years prior to job loss, and that larger shocks lead to larger consumption drops. These results
justify the assumption that unemployment spells are unanticipated wealth shocks, implying that
we can obtain unbiased estimates of the β coeﬃcients within each of the four groups (homeowners,
renters, small shock, and big shock).
To test H1 and H2, we compare the consumption responses to unemployment across the groups,
and attribute the diﬀerences in behavior to commitment eﬀects. A natural concern with this
empirical strategy is that the groups being compared diﬀer in many respects aside from adjustment
costs and size of shocks. For example, homeowners are on average wealthier and more educated
than renters; moreover, because of their wealth and ability to smooth intertemporally, homeowners
are likely to experience a smaller proportional wealth shock during unemployment. Fortunately, our
empirical analysis does not require that homeowners and renters be identical along such dimensions,
11Ad i ﬀerent line of evidence suggesting that complementarity eﬀects are not central is given by Aguiar and Hurst
(2005). They explicitly compute measures of “consumption” and “expenditure” while unemployed and conclude that
the reduction in expenditure while unemployed is indeed a reduction in consumption, unlike the drop in expenditure
at retirement.
17because we compare the composition of the expenditure reductions (food vs housing) and not the
l e v e l s . T ot e s tH 1 ,w eo n l yr e q u i r et h a ti fh o m e o w n e r sw e r et of a c et h es a m ea d j u s t m e n tc o s t s
as renters, they would behave like renters in the sense that they would cut both f and x.I ft h i s
assumption holds, evidence that homeowners cut only f while renters reduce both f and x would
allow us to conclude that homeowners’ adjustment costs generate distorted consumption responses.
In the course of describing the empirical results, we discuss several pieces of evidence — such as
comparisons of pre-unemployment trends and the inclusion of various controls — which suggest that
the results are not spuriously generated by diﬀerences in preferences across the groups.
Before proceeding, it may be helpful to clarify the purpose of testing H1 and H2. As described
above, there are various reasons that the consumption distortion (and resulting ampliﬁcation of
risk aversion) due to commitments could be small. By testing H1 and H2, we can answer the basic
question of whether commitments have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the welfare cost of real risks such as
unemployment. However, these tests do not shed light on whether commitments aﬀect ex-ante risk
attitudes, i.e., whether agents make insurance purchases or portfolio choices diﬀerently when they
have more commitments. These questions have been examined in other recent empirical studies
(Shore and Sinai 2005; Chetty and Szeidl 2005b).
2.2 Data
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics spanning 1968 to 2003. The PSID
tracks approximately 6,000 households and their splitoﬀs over time, and is the primary source
of longitudinal data on consumption in the US. The key variables for our tests are employment
status, food consumption, and housing consumption. We follow Zeldes (1989) and Gruber (1997)
in deﬁning these variables. We deﬁne an individual as “unemployed” if he reports working at the
time of the previous interview and searching for a job at the time of the current interview. We
deﬁne food consumption as the sum of household consumption at home, away, and paid for by food
stamps. We measure housing consumption as annual rent payments for renters, and home value
for homeowners. Since we only examine growth rates of consumption, it is not critical to translate
t h eh o m ev a l u e si n t om e a s u r e so fﬂow housing consumption except for cases where individuals
switch from owning to renting or vice versa. In our baseline analysis, we omit these “switchers” for
simplicity. We then show that including these switchers by computing the rental value of owning a
18house using a user cost series or computing diﬀerences between mortgage payments and rent does
not aﬀect the results.
The food, rent, and home value data are deﬂated using food and housing price deﬂators from
the CPI to obtain real growth rates. Although the consumption data are reported at an annual
frequency, the framing of the consumption questions refers to the point of the interview. As pointed
out by Zeldes and Gruber, this justiﬁes the use of these variables as measures of consumption during
the time of the interview rather than measures of total consumption over the past year.
We make three restrictions on the raw data to obtain the core sample used in the empirical
analysis. First, we include only observations for household heads who are between the age of 20
and 65. Second, we exclude observations where there was a change in the number of people in the
household, to avoid biases in total consumption measures due to changes in the size of a household
unit. Finally, to facilitate event studies of unemployment shocks, we only include individuals
who report becoming unemployed once during the sample period.12 There are some years when
food and housing data were not collected (e.g., 1973-1975 and 1988-89), requiring us to omit these
observations from the analysis.
These exclusions leave 1,869 unemployment spells (each of which corresponds to a diﬀerent
individual) and a total of 25,726 observations in the core sample. Table 2 reports summary
statistics for homeowners and renters in this sample. All monetary values are in 2003 dollars.
More than 20 years of data are available for the average individual, permitting a long event-study
of behavior around unemployment shocks.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Graphical Event-Study Analysis
We begin by providing graphical evidence on the eﬀect of unemployment shocks on consumption
patterns to test the two hypotheses. We then show the robustness of these results to controls,
sample selection, and other potential speciﬁcation concerns using a set of regressions.
We construct event-study graphs by normalizing the year of unemployment as 0 for all indi-
12Event studies become more complicated with multiple events because of potential overlaps in the “pre” and
“post” periods for diﬀerent shocks. Therefore, to simplify the empirical analysis, we focus on individuals with only
one spell.
19viduals, and deﬁne all other years relative to this base year (e.g., the year before the shock is -1,
the year after the shock is +1). We examine consumption behavior in a ten year window around
the unemployment shock by computing real annual growth rates for each of the consumption mea-
sures. For example, for an individual who lost his job in 1990, the growth rate in year -4 refers to
consumption growth from 1985 to 1986. We compare the mean growth rates of food and housing
in each year from -4 to +5 for various subsets of the data to test the hypotheses of interest.
We ﬁrst test the adjustment cost hypothesis (H1) by comparing the consumption responses
of renters and homeowners to unemployment. Figure 3a plots mean growth rates of food and
housing consumption for individuals who rented in year -1. For this group, both housing and food
consumption grow at roughly 1% per year prior to job loss. In the year of job loss, both food and
housing consumption fall from their pre-unemployment level by approximately 8%. Consumption
growth becomes positive again in subsequent years, as both food and housing recover gradually to
the pre-unemployment levels. Note that a t-test does not reject the null hypothesis that renters
cut food and housing consumption equally in year 0 (p =0 .26).
Figure 3b shows the same series for individuals who were homeowners in year -1. Consumption
trends prior to job loss are generally similar for homeowners and renters. However, homeowners
cut back sharply on food consumption (9%), but reduce housing consumption much less on average
(<2%). The null hypothesis that homeowners cut food and housing equally when unemployed can
be rejected with p<0.01.
The evidence in Figures 3a-b supports the prediction that commitments force agents to concen-
trate consumption responses to shocks on adjustable goods. In particular, the fact that homeowners
cut food consumption but not housing indicates that the welfare cost of unemployment is larger
than it would be in the absence of housing commitments.13 Since food consumption drops sub-
stantially for homeowners, we can reject the alternative hypothesis that the welfare costs of housing
commitments are circumvented by intertemporal smoothing or other channels.
Figures 4 and 5 examine hypothesis 2 regarding small vs. large shocks. These ﬁgures include
only homeowners, the group that appears to face a binding housing commitment. We classify an
13Note that the magnitude of the food consumption drop is not much larger for homeowners than renters. This
is consistent with the fact that homeowners are wealthier and thus experience a smaller shock (smaller ∆logW).
Hence, the implication is not that the welfare cost of unemployment is greater for homeowners than renters. Rather,
it is that the cost of unemployment for homeowners is larger than it would be if they could adjust housing as easily
as renters, holding all else ﬁxed.
20unemployment shock as a “large” shock if the total wage loss due to unemployment exceeds 33%,
i.e. total wage income in year 0 is at least 33% less than total wage income in year -1. This would
occur, e.g., if an individual had an unemployment spell that lasted for more than 17 weeks and
found a new job that paid the same wage as the old one.14 The remaining unemployment spells
are classiﬁed as “small” shocks. By this classiﬁcation, approximately 1/3 of the unemployment
spells are large shocks.
Figure 4a shows that food consumption falls by 8% in year 0 for homeowners who experienced
small unemployment shocks. In contrast, housing consumption remains roughly constant in the
years around the unemployment spell for this group. Figure 4b shows that food consumption falls
by 15% on average in year 0 for individuals who experience large wage losses due to unemployment,
conﬁrming that the shocks in this group are indeed larger than in the small shock sample. In
this group, housing consumption growth is -4% in year 0 and -10% in year 1. Hence, homeowners
adjust housing consumption downward quite sharply after a large unemployment shock, but much
of the adjustment occurs with a one-year lag. This suggests that homeowners diversify the impact
of large shocks by cutting both food and housing consumption over a two-year horizon.
To investigate the food and housing consumption responses over a two-year horizon more di-
rectly, Figure 5 plots two-year growth rates of these variables. In these ﬁgures, the growth rate
for food consumption in year 1 equals the change in log food consumption from year -1 to year 1.
Figure 5a shows that for small shocks, food consumption falls by nearly 10% from the year before
the unemployment spell to the year after the unemployment spell, whereas housing consumption
is roughly constant. The null hypothesis that both food and housing fall by equal percentages
is rejected with p =0 .02. Figure 5b shows that for large shocks, the consumption response is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. From the year before job loss to the year after job loss, food consumption
falls by 20% and housing consumption falls by 15%. In this case, the null hypothesis that the
reduction in housing and food is equal is not rejected (p =0 .58).
The evidence in Figures 4 and 5 supports the hypothesis that commitments amplify the welfare
cost of moderate scale shocks, but not large shocks. In particular, once a shock is suﬃciently large,
homeowners no longer choose to bear the cost of reducing food sharply, and mitigate the welfare
cost of the shock by re-optimizing over both food and housing consumption.
14Other deﬁnitions of “large shocks” (e.g. wage loss <25% or <15%) yield qualitatively similar results.
213.2 Regression Estimates
We evaluate the robustness of the graphical results by running a set of regressions that correspond
to (7), augmented with controls. In the interest of making limited functional form assumptions, we
estimate separate equations for each group (e.g., homeowners and renters), eﬀectively permitting
all the parameters of the estimating equation to vary across the groups. The primary estimating
equation for the analysis thus has the following form:
git = α + βunempit + θ1(Xit − X)+θ2(Xit − X)unempit + εi (10)
where gt =l o g ( ct)−log(ct−1) denotes the growth rate of a consumption measure (food or housing),
unempit =1iﬀ individual i is unemployed in year t,a n dXit denotes a set of covariates. Interactions
of the Xit covariates with the unemployment shock are permitted to control for diﬀerences in the
eﬀect of the shock across individuals with diﬀerent characteristics. For example, homeowners tend
to be older and could therefore respond diﬀerently to a shock than renters, who are younger on
average. The speciﬁcation with controls addresses this concern by eﬀectively reporting estimates
of β for homeowners and renters of the same age. The covariates are de-meaned by subtracting the
sample mean (X), so that the coeﬃcient β can always be interpreted as the eﬀect of unemployment
on consumption growth for an individual who has the mean characteristics of the sample in terms
of observables. Standard errors are clustered by household to allow for potential serial correlation
in consumption growth rates, e.g. due to measurement error.
Table 3 reports several estimates of β using variants of (10) that give evidence on the ﬁrst test
comparing homeowners and renters. The ﬁrst two columns of the table give results on food and
housing growth for individuals who were renters prior to job loss (β
f
R and βx
R in (8)), while columns
three and four report analogous estimates for those who were homeowners in year -1 (β
f
H and βx
H
in (9)). Each row reports an estimate of β for the relevant dependent variable and subgroup for a
diﬀerent speciﬁcation of (10).
In the ﬁrst row, we replicate the simple graphical analysis by estimating (10) without any
controls (no X). Not surprisingly, the estimates conﬁrm the graphical analysis. Renters cut food
consumption by 7.3% and housing consumption by 8.6%, whereas homeowners cut food by 9.4%
and housing by a (statistically insigniﬁcant) 1.8%. The second row adds several covariates to the
speciﬁcation: age, marital status, education, number of people in household, and lagged annual
22wage income. The estimates from this speciﬁcation are quite similar to those in row 1. Renters
with observable characteristics reﬂective of the sample mean cut both food and housing by 8-10%
on average when unemployed, whereas homeowners with the same observables cut food signiﬁcantly
and housing very little.
The estimates of β in the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations are identiﬁed using both the “between” variation
that compares growth rates across individuals who are unemployed and employed and the “within”
variation that examines how growth rates for a particular individual change when unemployment
occurs. To address concerns that the between variation may be contaminated by diﬀerences in
unobservables across individuals, speciﬁcation 3 introduces individual ﬁxed eﬀects in the growth
rates, which isolates the within variation. The coeﬃcients remain similar, supporting the claim
that the coeﬃcients give unbiased estimates of the causal eﬀect of unemployment on consumption
patterns.
The fourth speciﬁcation takes an alternative, less parametric approach to address concerns
about diﬀerences between homeowners and renters. As noted above, wealthy homeowners may
be able to cut on food expenditure signiﬁcantly without suﬀering much of a welfare cost (e.g., by
visiting restaurants less frequently or buying less caviar). Individuals with high food expenditures
might ideally cut primarily food expenditure, even if housing were freely adjustable. The observed
drop in food but not housing for homeowners thus might not be evidence of distorted behavior due
to housing commitments. To address this concern, we eliminate all individuals who report average
annual food consumption per household member above the 75th percentile ($3,758) and replicate
speciﬁcation (1). The results remain very similar for this lower-food group, suggesting that the
reductions in food expenditure and not housing are indeed evidence of distorted behavior.
The graphical analysis and preceding speciﬁcations discard observations where households
switch between owning and renting because the growth rate of housing consumption is diﬃcult
to measure in these cases. In speciﬁcation 5, we investigate whether this selective omission biases
the results by bringing these observations into the analysis. To do so, we compute the rental
value of a house using a user cost series developed by Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), which
gives user costs for 46 MSAs over 25 years. We compute an “annual rent” for homeowners by
multiplying reported home value by the user cost for the corresponding state/year pair. We then
compute the growth rate of housing consumption as the change in rent for all observations in the
sample. Row 5 reports estimates analogous to those in row 1 with this alternate deﬁnition of
23housing consumption growth using the full sample. The estimates are roughly similar, indicating
that the results are not sensitive to the treatment of the ownership-rent switchers.
Finally, we investigate robustness of the results to outliers in consumption growth. We replicate
the baseline speciﬁcation (1) after winsorizing the consumption growth data by recoding food
growth rates in the top 1% of the distribution to the 99th percentile of the food growth distribution,
which equals 1.37. Similarly, food growth rates in the bottom 1% are recoded to the 1st percentile
of the distribution, −1.32. Housing growth rates are winsorized analogously. As shown in row 6,
the estimates do not change signiﬁcantly when the outliers are trimmed.15 Hence, the β estimates
in all six speciﬁcations support hypothesis 1.
Table 4 repeats this robustness analysis for the second test comparing the eﬀects of small vs.
large shocks for homeowners. Since the graphical evidence suggests that two-year growth rates
are most informative in capturing the full adjustment of housing and food to large unemployment
shocks, we use two-year growth rates of the relevant consumption measure as the dependent vari-
ables in Table 4. Correspondingly, we include only observations in two-year intervals centered
around the unemployment window (years -3, -1, +1, +3, etc.)
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation in Table 4, which does not have any controls, conﬁrms the visual ﬁnding
that food drops by approximately 9% for “small” unemployment shocks. while housing growth is
close to zero. In contrast, for large shocks, both food and housing drop by about 17-20% over the
two year period following job loss. The remaining rows of the table show that these results are
robust to the inclusion of controls and other speciﬁcation checks as in Table 3. Hence, hypothesis
2 is also supported by all of the speciﬁcations.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 are also robust to several other speciﬁcation checks, including the
following: (1) changing the control set or including controls in the trimmed speciﬁcation or imputed
rental value of housing speciﬁcations, etc. (2) dropping the small fraction (<2%) of observations
where food or housing consumption is imputed; and (3) varying the assumptions regarding error
structure by clustering standard errors by state or year.
In summary, the empirical evidence documented above strongly supports the commitments
model, provided that the identiﬁcation assumptions about comparability across groups are valid.
15Discarding the outliers also yields qualitatively similar results. The winsorized estimates are likely to suﬀer less
from “iatrogenic” speciﬁcation error due to trimming, insofar as the outliers are correlated with large consumption
changes (Angrist and Krueger 2002, Bollinger and Chandra 2003).
24While we cannot prove the validity of these assumptions, there are several reasons to believe
that the results are not spuriously generated by diﬀerences in preferences. First, there is no
obvious ex-ante reason that the diﬀerence in the growth of food and housing consumption during
unemployment should vary across the four groups as observed. Second, the consumption growth
rates are similar across the groups prior to the unemployment event, supporting the claim that
these groups are comparable on these dimensions. Third, the fact that controlling for observed
heterogeneity in various ways does not aﬀect the results suggests that the estimates are not likely
to be very sensitive to unobservable heterogeneity across the groups either. Finally, the ﬁnding
that homeowners behave similarly to renters for large shocks supports the assumption that the
composition of expenditure reductions would be similar in these groups absent diﬀerences in the
adjustment costs of housing.
3.3 How much is risk aversion ampliﬁed?
The empirical estimates of the β coeﬃcients can be used to obtain a rough numerical estimate of
the extent to which commitments amplify moderate-scale risk aversion. Consider the case with
separable utility over food and housing:
u(f,x)=
f1−γf
1 − γf
+ µ
x1−γx
1 − γx
.
Using (2), the ratio of curvatures over wealth with and without adjustment costs is
γc
γn =1+
x
f
γf
γx
. (11)
Intuitively, when the curvatures over food and housing are equal, ampliﬁcation depends only on
the ratio of commitment to food consumption. When commitments constitute a higher share of
expenditures, shocks are concentrated on a smaller food margin, and risk aversion is higher. When
γf > γx, the consumer is particularly risk averse over adjustable goods, amplifying risk aversion
further.
To obtain an estimate of (11), note that the optimal choice of a consumer who is free to adjust
on both margins satisﬁes
γf
γx
=
dlogx
dlogW
/
dlogf
dlogW
.
25In this two good model, f should be interpreted as a composite commodity representing all non-
commitment consumption and x represents all commitment consumption. A diﬃculty in computing
γc
γn using our empirical evidence is that we examine only housing commitments and therefore do not
have direct evidence on how consumers behave when they can freely adjust all commitment goods
(e.g. vehicle, insurance contracts, furniture, etc.). We therefore assume that curvature of utility
over housing is representative of the curvature over all commitment goods, and that curvature over
food is representative of the curvature over adjustables. Under this assumption, the point estimates
in the ﬁrst row of Table 3 imply
γf
γx = −8.68%
−7.39% =1 .17 if renters can freely adjust on both food and
housing when hit by an unemployment shock. To compute x
f, note that Warren and Tyagi (2003)
report a commitment share of 70%; a more conservative estimate based on the categories in Table
1 is a 50% commitment share (housing, vehicles, utilities, health, and education). When x
f =1 ,
γc
γn =2 .17;w h e nx
f = 0.7
0.3,
γc
γn =3 .74. Hence, commitments appear to magnify risk aversion by
roughly a factor of 3 based on this rough calculation.
T h et r u ea m p l i ﬁcation eﬀect of commitments may be larger than our calculation suggests for
two reasons. First, our estimate of γf/γx assumes that renters face no adjustment costs in housing.
Insofar as moving between rented apartments involves some adjustment costs, our estimate of
(dlogx/dlogW)/(dlogf/dlogW) is a lower bound for the true γf/γx. Second, the calculations
above ignore borrowing constraints, which presumably bind for many unemployed individuals given
the observed consumption patterns. As shown in equation (5), borrowing constraints magnify risk
aversion with respect to temporary shocks further beyond the pure commitment eﬀect by a factor
related to the intertemporal smoothing horizon of the agent.
4 Implications of Commitments
When agents have consumption commitments, risk aversion is context-speciﬁc, and in particular can
vary substantially with the scale of the risk. For shocks that are relatively small or short-lived, the
welfare cost of risk is large because agents with commitments concentrate shocks on a few margins
such as food. However, for shocks that are very large, there is more ﬂexibility to adjust behavior on
m a n ym a r g i n s ,a n dr i s ka v e r s i o ni sl o w e r . I n d i v i d u a l sc a nb er i s ks e e k i n gi nc e r t a i nr a n g e sb e c a u s e
commitments induce non-concavities in utility over wealth. Empirical evidence indicates that
housing commitments force households to concentrate moderate-scale shocks on easily adjustable
26goods such as food, supporting the mechanism that links commitments and the welfare cost of
shocks.
We conclude by speculating on some stylized facts and normative issues where the commitments
framework could be of relevance:
1. [Moderate-Stake Risk Aversion] The commitments model generates high moderate-stake risk
aversion without requiring excessive large-stake risk aversion, escaping Rabin’s (2000) critique
of expected utility. Commitments can therefore rationalize purchases of insurance against
relatively “small” shocks such as automobile or non-catastrophic health insurance.
2. [Social Insurance] Commitments can change the optimal design of large-scale social insurance
policies signiﬁcantly. Calibrations based on the standard one-good expected utility model
suggest that the optimal beneﬁt rate for unemployment insurance is close to zero (Gruber
1997). When commitments are taken into account, the beneﬁtr a t em a yb es u b s t a n t i a l l y
higher because of ampliﬁed risk aversion (Chetty 2003).16 However, the optimal beneﬁtr a t e
for long-term shocks such as disability may be much lower, insofar as all types of consumption
get adjusted in the long run.
3. [Gambling] The model can explain why racetrack bettors prefer bets with long odds and
large payoﬀs (Golec and Tamarkin 1998). It is also consistent with the ﬁnding that higher
income individuals are less likely to play the lottery overall, but are relatively more likely to
participate in lotteries that have very large payoﬀs (Clotfelter and Cook 1987).
4. [Asset Pricing] Flavin and Nakagawa (2003) analyze asset pricing in a two-good adjustment
cost model with complementarity between food and housing. They show that this model
outperforms existing models in matching consumption dynamics and asset prices because it
generates sluggish adjustment of consumption in response to shocks, as in habit formation
models.
5. [Habit Formation] Chetty and Szeidl (2005a) aggregate the two-good model developed here in
an economy of agents with heterogeneous commitments. They show formally that aggregate
16Interestingly, commitments appear to guide the choice of unemployment insurance beneﬁt levels in practice. In
the Arizona State Beneﬁt Adequacy Study, Burgess et. al. (1981) deﬁne “beneﬁt adequacy” in terms of covering
“the total of necessary/obligated expenses for the entire household.”
27dynamics in this economy coincide with those of a representative-consumer model with habit
formation preferences. In this sense, commitments can provide non-psychological, neoclas-
sical microfoundations for the habit formation preferences (e.g. Constantinides 1990) widely
used in macroeconomics and ﬁnance.
6. [Portfolio Choice] By amplifying risk aversion, commitments induce investors to hold safer
portfolios. Consistent with this prediction, Chetty and Szeidl (2005b) ﬁnd that an exogenous
increase in housing commitments causes a reallocation from stocks to bonds, suggesting that
the model can be useful in understanding portfolio choice behavior. The model also yields
normative implications in this context — e.g., institutions with signiﬁcant ﬁnancial commit-
ments should hold safer portfolios.
7. [Crime and Punishment] Becker (1968) showed that the optimal punishment strategy to deter
crime by risk averse agents is to combine large ﬁnes with a low probability of punishment.
In practice, however, ﬁrms devote extensive resources to enforcement and do not impose
extremely harsh penalties (see Dickens et. al. (1989), who label this a “monitoring puzzle”).
With commitments, employees may be more reluctant to steal or shirk if they face a high
probability of apprehension with a moderate ﬁne than a severe but improbable punishment.
8. [Wage Rigidities] Committed individuals may prefer a gamble in which they get ﬁr e dw i t ha
small probability rather than take a reduction in wages with certainty, explaining workers’
disdain for small wage cuts as discussed in Bewley (1999). Postlewaite, Samuelson, and
Silverman (2005) show formally that ﬁrms may choose to lay oﬀ workers instead of reducing
wages in equilibrium in a model with commitments.
9. [Labor Supply] Mincer (1962) and Stephens (2003) document a large “added worker eﬀect”:
Spouses enter the labor force when primary earners become unemployed. Yet the income
elasticity of labor supply is small in the long run. Commitments can rationalize this behavior
by making the marginal welfare gain from consumption due to added labor supply greater in
the short run than in the long run. In the short run, spouses may enter the labor force to
help pay the mortgage and other bills; in the long run, these commitments can be adjusted
and there is less pressure to change work patterns.
10. [Taxation] Studies of the labor supply response to taxation generally ﬁnd small tax elasticities
28for households with incomes below $100,000 (see e.g., Gruber and Saez (2000). The inability
to fully reoptimize consumption in the short run may dampen responses to tax reforms even if
taxes are highly distortionary in the long run. In the short run, households may be reluctant
to cut labor supply in response to a tax increase if they have made prior commitments.
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32Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Consider equation (1) for the value function. We begin by showing that for a range of wealth
levels not moving is the optimal housing choice. The maximization problem of a consumer who
moves in period 1 is equivalent to maximizing the utility of a consumer with initial wealth W −kx0
and no adjustment costs over goods. By A1 and A2, both f and x are normal goods for this
consumer. As leftover wealth W−kx0 → 0, optimal consumption f,x → 0 by the budget constraint.
When W →∞ , by the Inada conditions, optimal consumption f,x →∞ . Hence the optimal choice
of x after a move is a strictly increasing function of W that maps onto the set of positive reals and is
continuous by the theorem of the maximum. It follows that there exist wealth levels WA <W B such
that the optimal choice of x following a move is x0(1−k/T) when W = WA and x0 when W = WB.
Then for all WA ≤ W ≤ WB the consumer optimally chooses not to move. To see why, note that
for W in this range, the optimal choice of x following a move must satisfy x0(1−k/T) ≤ x ≤ x0 and
hence total commitment spending is at least Tx0 −kx0. Given a budget of W −kx0, the consumer
c a na l l o c a t ea tm o s tW − Tx0 on food consumption, which is the amount he would allocate if he
decides not to move. It follows that after a move, both food and commitment consumption must
fall when WA ≤ W ≤ WB, which implies that staying is optimal in this range.
By the envelope theorem, the slopes of the value functions satisfy vm
1 (W, x0)=T ·u1(f,x) where
f and x are the optimal choices when moving, and v0
1(W, x0)=T ·u1(W/T −x0,x 0).F o rW<W A,
the optimal housing following a move satisﬁes x<x 0(1 − k/T), which implies
vm
1 (W,x0)=Tu1(f,x) <Tu 1(W/T − x0,x 0(1 − k/T)) <Tu 1(W/T − x0,x 0)=v0
1(W,x0)
using f +x =( W − kx0)/T and u12 ≥ 0 which holds by A2. Similarly, when W>W B,t h eo p t i m a l
housing choice satisﬁes x>x 0 and hence
vm
1 (W,x0)=Tu1(f,x) >Tu 1((W − kx0)/T − x0,x 0) >Tu 1(W/T − x0,x 0)=v0
1(W, x0).
It follows that for W<W A, v0 is steeper than vm,f o rWA ≤ W ≤ WB, v0 is above vm,a n df o r
WB <W, v0 is not as steep as vm. The optimal policy of the consumer is to move if and only if vm
is above v0. By our results, vm and v0 intersect at most once in the regions where W<W A and
W>W B. To show that the optimal policy is described by an (s,S) band, we need to prove that
intersections occur in both of these regions. For W small, A1 implies that u(f,x0) will be arbitrarily
close to the smallest possible utility level inff,xu(f,x).B y d e ﬁnition, this must be smaller than
period utility when moving, hence vm(W,x0)−v0(W, x0) is positive for W suﬃciently small. For W
large enough, the Inada conditions can be used to establish that vm(W, x0)−v0(W,x0) is positive.
To derive the comparative statics result with respect to k,n o t et h a tah i g h e rk reduces vm(W,x0)
for each value of W and x0, while it does not aﬀect v0(W, x0).A sar e s u l t ,a ts, the point where
vm and v0 intersected for a low k, the new vm will attain a lower value, which makes staying
optimal. Hence the new threshold level with high k must be below s.T h e r e s u l t f o r S can be
shown analogously.
33P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
(i) Under A3, the optimal choice of both f and x is proportional to W for a household without
adjustment costs. Therefore vn(W) is proportional to W1−γ and hence γn(W)=γ. By homogene-
ity, for any f and x
u1(f,x)f + u2(f,x)x =( 1− γ)u(f,x)
and diﬀerentiating with respect to f yields
−u11(f,x)
u1(f,x)
f −
u12(f,x)
u1(f,x)
x = γ
showing that γf(f,x) ≥ γ for all f and x by A2. But γc = γfεc
f,W > γ because εc
f,W = W/(Tf) > 1.
Under A4, we have εn
f,w < 1/T. To see why, note that the within period ﬁrst order condition
for a consumer without adjustment costs implies
εn
f,W =
γx
γf
εn
x,W < εn
x,W
and since a weighted average of εn
f,W and εn
x,W equals 1/T,i tm u tb et h a tεn
f,W < 1/T.T o
compute risk aversion, recall γn(W)=γfεn
f,W < γf ac o n s t a n t ,w h i l eγc = γfεc
f,W > γf because
εc
f,W = W/(Tf) > 1/T.
(ii) The proof follows from (i). Under A3, γc(W0)=γ while γc(W) > γ as above. Under A4,
γc(W0) < γf while γc(W) > γf.
( i i i )W eh a v evc
1(s−,x 0)=vm
1 (s,x0) and vc
1(s+,x 0)=v0
1(s,x0). By the proof of Lemma 1,
vm
1 (s,x0) <v 0
1(s,x0) since s<W A. An analogous argument establishes that indirect utility is
locally convex at S.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
(i) Denote the value function when adjustment costs equal k by vk,c(W,x0).W eh a v evk1,c(W,x0) ≥
vk1,c(W, x0) for all W, and therefore
vk1,c(Wk1,CE,x 0)=Evk1,c(f W,x0) ≥ Evk2,c(f W,x0)=vk2,c(Wk2,CE,x 0).
Since Wk1,CE ∈ (sk1,Sk1),w eh a v evk1,c(Wk1,CE,x 0)=vk2,c(Wk1,CE,x 0) which combined with the
above chain of inequalities gives Wk1,CE ≥ Wk2,CE and hence π(f W,x0,k 1) ≤ π(f W,x0,k 2).
(ii) For σ2 small, the statement holds because the risk premium per unit of risk is determined by
the curvature of the utility function locally. When σ2 grows without bound, f W will assign proba-
bility close to 1 to the region outside (s,S) and expected utility approximately equals Evm(f W,x0).
Under A3, outside the (s,S) band the value function exhibits constant relative risk aversion γ,
therefore the risk premium per unit risk asymptotes to γ. Under A4, local risk aversion outside the
(s,S) band is always less then γf. This implies that the risk premium per unit risk for vm(f W,x0)
is always lower than what it would be for a constant relative risk aversion utility function with
curvature γf.H e n c et h el i ms u po fγ(σ2) is at most γf in this case, which is less than γc(Ef W) by
part (ii) above.
34TABLE 1
Mean Household Expenditure Shares
Income Group
Category $30-40K $50-70K >$70K Overall Mean
Shelter 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.20
Transport (excluding gas and maint) 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16
Utilities, fuels, and public services 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
Health care 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06
Education 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Food 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15
Apparel 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.15
Household supplies and furniture 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.06
Entertainment 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
Miscellaneous 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Cash contributions 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04
Mean annual expenditure $15,369 $32,609 $64,134 $35,930
Mean take-home pay $6,858 $29,720 $90,748 $41,531
   aSource: BLS tabulations from Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2000
   bTake-home pay defined as gross income net of taxes and mandatory insurance/pension contributionsMean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Annual wage income $25,234 $25,922 $18,879 $16,547 $32,113 $31,810
Annual food expend. $6,439 $3,771 $5,601 $3,220 $7,351 $4,102
Annual rent $5,039 $5,119
House value $109,959 $154,691
Age 37.9 11.1 34.7 10.5 41.3 10.7
Married 56.1% 49.6% 38.4% 48.6% 75.4% 43.1%
Years of education 11.9 2.8 11.7 2.7 12.1 2.9
Household size 2.8 1.6 2.5 1.6 3.0 1.5
Moved in next year 25.5% 25.5% 36.6% 36.6% 10.2% 10.2%
Rent-Own switch 5.7% 23.2% 6.8% 25.2% 4.6% 20.8%
Years in sample 20.8 10.5 19.7 10.7 21.7 10.2
Total Observations 23,752 12,377 11,375
NOTE -- Sample consists of heads of household between age of 20 and 65 in PSID (1968-2003)
who report becoming unemployed exactly once.  Observations with a change in number of
household members are excluded. All monetary variables are in real 2003 dollars.
Variable "moved in next year" equals 1 iff household reports moving within one year after interview.
Variable "rent-own switch" equals 1 iff household switches from renting to owning or vice versa
in year after interview.
TABLE 2
Pooled Renters Homeowners
Summary Statistics for PSID SampleSpecification Food Housing Food Housing
1. No controls -0.074 -0.087 -0.094 -0.018
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
2. Full controls -0.103 -0.088 -0.086 -0.014
(0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.039)
3. Indiv. fixed effects -0.11 -0.089 -0.082 -0.008
(0.028) (0.025) (0.030) (0.048)
4. Low-food -0.069 -0.086 -0.095 -0.031
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026)
5. Imputed rental values -0.074 -0.081 -0.094 0.014
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023)
6. Outliers trimmed -0.068 -0.084 -0.088 -0.027
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
NOTE -- Table shows estimates of b coefficient in equation 10 in text.  Sample for left two columns 
consists of households in core sample who rent in year before unemployment.  Sample for right two
columns consists of households in core sample who are homeowners in year before unemployment.
See notes to Table 2 for definition of core sample.  All standard errors are clustered by individual to 
correct for serial correlation.  Each row corresponds to a different specification of equation 10.  See text
for details of the specifications.
Homeowners Renters
TABLE 3
Effect of Unemployment on Consumption Growth - Homeowners vs RentersSpecification Food Housing Food Housing
1. No controls -0.089 -0.016 -0.203 -0.172
(0.027) (0.025) (0.053) (0.050)
2. Full controls -0.101 0.008 -0.184 -0.213
(0.030) (0.030) (0.051) (0.055)
3. Indiv. fixed effects -0.090 0.000 -0.217 -0.193
(0.041) (0.040) (0.068) (0.063)
4. Low-food -0.095 -0.026 -0.240 -0.198
(0.030) (0.028) (0.061) (0.055)
5. Imputed rental values -0.089 -0.011 -0.203 -0.111
(0.027) (0.029) (0.053) (0.052)
6. Outliers trimmed -0.086 -0.023 -0.187 -0.159
(0.026) (0.022) (0.049) (0.044)
NOTE -- Table shows estimates of b coefficient in equation 10 in text.  Dependent variables are
two-year growth rates of food and housing consumption.  Sample for left two columns 
consists of households in core sample who rent in year before unemployment.  Sample for right two
columns consists of households in core sample who are homeowners in year before unemployment.
See notes to Table 2 for definition of core sample.  All standard errors are clustered by individual to 
correct for serial correlation.  Each row corresponds to a different specification of equation 10.  See text
for details of the specifications.
TABLE 4
Effect of Unemployment on Two-Year Consumption Growth - Small vs Large Shock
Small Shock Large ShockFIGURE 1A
EFFECT OF COMMITMENTS ON VALUE FUNCTION
NOTE–This figure shows the value function of a consumer with consumption commitments
(heavy line). The adjustment cost makes it optimal not to move as long as W  s,S. Outside
the s,S band moving is optimal, because maximized utility when the consumer does not
adjust (dotted line) is below maximized utility with adjustment. The presence of commitments
increases curvature and magnifies risk aversion inside the s,S band relative to a consumer
with no adjustment costs (thin line). The value functions were constructed for the period utility
function uf,x  f1f/1  f  x1x/1  x with f  4, x  2a n d  0.1, with a time
horizon T  5 and adjustment cost k  0.2. These parameters were chosen to make the impact
of commitments visually clear, and may not necessarily match household preferences,
borrowing constraints, or adjustment costs.FIGURE 1B
COMMITMENTS AND BORROWING CONSTRAINTS
NOTE–This figure shows the value function of a consumer with consumption commitments
and borrowing constraints (dotted line). For high wealth realizations, utility is identical to that
of a consumer with no borrowing constraints (thin line). For low wealth realizations utility
falls sharply relative to the benchmark with no borrowing constraints, because the consumer is
unable to smooth the impact of a shock intertemporally. The preferences and other parameters
used in constructing this figure are the same as those used in the construction of Figure 1a.FIGURE 2
RISK AVERSION FOR SMALL AND LARGE RISKS
NOTE–This figure plots the risk premium per unit of risk (see text for definition), which is a
measure of risk aversion, for shocks of various sizes. For a consumer with high adjustment
costs, such as a homeowner, (heavy line) risk aversion is greatly amplified for small to
moderate scale risks. For a consumer with lower adjustment costs, such as a renter (dotted line)
risk aversion is greatly amplified for small shocks, but less than it is for homeowners. As a
basis for comparison, a consumer with no commitments and power utility preferences with risk
aversion   2 has a constant risk premium per unit risk for all shocks (dashed line). The
preferences used in constructing this figure are the same as those used in Figure 1; the
adjustment cost is k  1 for homeowners and k  0.2 for renters.FIGURE 3
HYPOTHESIS 1 – HOMEOWNERS VS. RENTERS
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Year Relative to Unemployment
T-test for equality at 0: p = 0.26
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NOTE–These figures show real annual growth rates of food and housing consumption from year t-1 to year t.
The year of job loss is normalized to 0 for all individuals. The sample for figure A includes all households in the
core sample who rented in year -1. The sample for Figure B includes all households in the core sample who
owned a house in year -1. See notes to Table 2 for definition of core sample. For each group, p values are
reported for tests of the null hypothesis that the growth rates of food and housing have the same mean within that
group in year 0.FIGURE 4
HYPOTHESIS 2 – SMALL VS. LARGE SHOCKS
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A. Small Unemployment Shocks
Year Relative to Unemployment
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B. Large Unemployment Shocks
Year Relative to Unemployment
Housing (Home Value) Food
NOTE–These figures show real annual growth rates of food and housing consumption. The year of job loss is
normalized to 0 for all individuals. The sample for Figure A includes homeowners in the core sample who had an
annual wage income growth rate greater than -33% in year 0. The sample for Figure B includes the remainder of
the households in the core sample. See notes to Table 2 for definition of core sample.FIGURE 5
HYPOTHESIS 2 – TWO-YEAR GROWTH RATES
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T-test for equality at 0: p = 0.02
A. Small Unemployment Shocks
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T-test for equality at 0: p = 0.58
B. Large Unemployment Shocks
NOTE–These figures show real two-year growth rates of food and housing consumption from year t-2 to year t.
The year of job loss is normalized to 0 for all individuals. The sample for Figure A includes homeowners in the
core sample who had an annual wage income growth rate greater than -33% in year 0. The sample for Figure B
includes the remainder of the core sample. See notes to Table 2 for definition of core sample. For each group, p
values are reported for tests of the null hypothesis that the two-year growth rates of food and housing have the
same mean within that group in year 1.